E-Government in China by Schlæger Jesper;Schlæger Jesper;

Author:Schlæger, Jesper;Schlæger, Jesper;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1323335
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group

Conclusion

The findings from the service-centre e-government reforms are that over-the-counter corruption has been reduced, administrative efficiency has increased, and more transparency about procedures has been attained. On the other hand, the masses are kept at greater distance from the core apparatus of the local state. Incentives for other types of administrative corruption taking place outside the view of the virtual panopticon have not changed, and core bureaucracies have only been marginally reformed. In all, e-government reforms have succeeded in creating better governance measured by time consumption and degree of government openness. And, above all, a more conducive soft environment for investment was created alongside strengthening local government supervisory capacity within the government. Nevertheless, it happened without vesting final supervisory power with the people of Chengdu.

Leading to the reinforcement of the interests of the political leaders in the district and their superiors are new e-government mediated mechanisms combined with a mix of tools of organizational power that support each other. First, the virtual panopticon works as hypothesized. Because of the risk of constant monitoring, the agents will start to self-regulate in fear of sanctions (loss of performance bonus, difficult to get promotion) and hope for benefits (performance pay, employee-of-the-month bonus). The total monitoring further incorporates e-government-enabled methods such as an automated red alert. This enhances the effect of virtual panopticon because the agent knows that not only is there a risk the Bureau of Supervision may be watching, but also the Bureau will now definitely be alerted to exceeded time limits and can then go back and watch CCTV, look at the case-process file, and through these means almost certainly locate any untoward behaviour. Second, the battering ram gels. New problems arise on the organizational level because the authority relations and incentive structures are not attuned and government attempts to use e-government as a battering ram fail. A number of old bureaus are not willing to have their authority removed. The main points of the case are summarized in Figure 5.3.

Following the research, questions are answered in relation to the case of service centres. The first question was: who controls e-government in the processes of administrative approval? This is based on the standards set from above, more specifically through the informatization office. The system has to fit with the government affairs hall and the business network platform. Based on the analysis in the previous chapter it is clear that e-government in the final analysis is controlled by the political leaders in the municipal and district committees.

Second, whose interests are served by e-government in processes of administrative approval? Not surprisingly, and in accordance with the reinforcement

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